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1. INTRODUCTION
On December 16, 2008, the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut sentenced Ronald E. Ferguson, CEO of Gen Re Corporation,
on charges of conspiracy, securities fraud, and mail fraud for his role in or-
chestrating an illegal scheme that resulted in almost $600 million in market
1
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decline of AIG Corporation's stock price.' Despite the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (Guidelines) recommending life in prison2 for these crimes, the
court sentenced Ferguson for two years.3 At sentencing, the court empha-
sized that Ferguson did not gain directly from this loss amount.4 Instead, this
amount resulted from later marketplace transactions.
Ferguson's direct responsibility involves the issue of market loss, a
unique type of victim loss that a court calculates for sentencing purposes,
which consists of losses third-party shareholders suffer, normally after revela-
tion of the fraud.6 This Article will discuss how the victim loss amount influ-
ences the Guidelines for fraud under section 2B1.1 and how these Guidelines
provide harsh imprisonment terms when loss amounts reach the hundreds of
millions of dollars. Such dollar amounts are common when employing mar-
ket loss. When the fraud becomes public knowledge, the price of a security
listed on an efficient market quickly will incorporate the new information,
7
causing a sharp decrease in the security's price. Because defendant respon-
sibility is unclear with market loss, judges often are hesitant to apply severe
Guideline sentences to such defendants,8 as was the case with Ferguson.
Such hesitance creates disparities between judges who apply the Guidelines,
and those judges who do not. This Article will examine these problems and
how they result from a failure to differentiate market loss from direct loss.
Part II analyzes the history of market loss, a calculation of loss that
arose as a damage calculation in private plaintiff civil securities fraud actions.
This Part describes the evolving theory of loss causation in order to under-
stand the foundation for market loss at criminal sentencing. This Part also
explains how market loss might have been used in sentencing before the
Guidelines.
After the codification of the Guidelines, victim loss became the official
driving factor in fraud sentencing. Thus, Part III examines the loss table and
how a large loss finding leads to a long prison term recommendation. Be-
cause the court must calculate victim loss to adhere to the Guidelines, courts
determine market loss in a manner similar to previous civil securities fraud
cases. Part III also analyzes the subsequent developments in federal court.
1. United States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d 447, 448-50 (D. Conn. 2008);
John D. Esterhay, "Street Justice "for Corporate Fraud - Mandatory Minimums for
Major White-Collar Crime, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 135, 170 (2010).
2. Esterhay, supra note 1, at 170-71.
3. Id. at 170.
4. Transcript of Sentencing at 102-03, Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d 447 (No. 06-
137).
5. Id.
6. See Kevin P. McCormick, Comment, Untangling the Capricious Effects of
Market Loss in Securities Fraud Sentencing, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1145, 1151-52 (2008).
7. Id. at 1152.
8. Id. at 1149.
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Part IV argues that market loss is inappropriate for criminal sentencing
in its current form, because it differs from direct victim loss due to weaker
causation. A defendant might be civilly liable for market loss, but he is not
responsible for that loss in the way that criminal sentencing should require.
Loss causation, even if sufficient in civil cases, should be afforded special
treatment for sentencing purposes.
Part V presents a solution in which market loss punishes the defendant
less severely than direct loss because of the weaker causal link. Adopting a
parallel loss table for market loss can accomplish this differentiation. Such
an amendment to the Guidelines would help solve the problems this Article
identifies.
II. THE CIVIL DAMAGES ORIGINS OF MARKET LOSS AT SENTENCING
Before the adoption of the Guidelines, courts were not required to pre-
cisely define loss for criminal sentencing. Consequently, courts first devel-
oped the theory of market loss for civil securities fraud cases and later applied
it to sentencing. While courts now use market loss in any type of fraud case,
the history of civil securities fraud continues to resonate in criminal sentenc-
ing.9
A. Securities Fraud in Private 1Ob-5 Actions
In response to the 1929 stock market crash and subsequent Great De-
pression, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act). Section 10(b) of the '34 Act author-
ized securities fraud enforcement pursuant to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Rule 1Ob-5, which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
9. See infra Part II.A.
2011] Ill15
3
Esterhay: Esterhay: Apples and Oranges
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
6MISSOURI LA WREVIEW
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.10
Rule lOb-5 authorizes three enforcement mechanisms: "(1) criminal enforce-
ment via prosecution by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), (2) civil en-
forcement actions by the SEC, and (3) civil enforcement by private parties.""
While criminal prosecution was an option from the beginning,12 neither Rule
1Ob-5 nor any statute contemplated civil enforcement by private parties.13
After the SEC advocated for a private cause of action in an amicus
brief,14 courts began endorsing this right in 1946.15 In 1971, the U.S. Su-
preme Court affirmed private 1Ob-5 enforcement.16 In the first few decades
of securities lawsuits, private remedies were successful, 7 mitigating the ne-
cessity for criminal prosecution. Additional procedural hurdles including a
lack of resources in federal regulatory agencies like the SEC, complexity and
difficulty of proof in major fraud cases combined with the lack of federal
prosecutor security fraud expertise, the requirement for coordination and co-
operation between the SEC and DOJ, and the SEC's focus on civil actions
further limited the incidence of criminal enforcement.' 9 Therefore, criminal
securities fraud prosecutions did not begin to flourish until the civil doctrine
was established.
B. Victim Loss
When private plaintiffs began filing securities fraud 1Ob-5 actions,
courts had to develop a theory for calculating damages. The first question
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2010).
11. McCormick, supra note 6, at 1152.
12. Id.
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5s; see
also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) ("10(b) does not by its
terms create an express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no indication that
Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, contemplated such a reme-
dy").
14. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963, 990
(1994) (citing Brief of Securities & Exchange Commission, Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (Civ. A. No. 6203)).
15. See Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514; see also William S. Feinstein, Pleading
Securities Fraud with Particularly - Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) in the Rule
10-5 Context: Kowal v. MCI Communications Corporation, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
851, 854 (1995).
16. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
17. See McCormick, supra note 6, at 1154.
18. See id. at 1153, 1155.
19. Id. at 1155-56.
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was whether damages should consist of loss to the plaintiff or gain to the
defendant. While many frauds result in the defendant taking exactly what
the plaintiff lost,21 in securities fraud, these amounts often diverge22 due to
the attenuated nature of loss in a widely-held security. Courts decided that
victim loss was the more appropriate figure for damages.23 Private plaintiff
civil cases use victim loss as the amount for damages, because such claims
arise as a remedy for losses the plaintiffs sustained.24 Secondly, from a prac-
tical standpoint, "causation is already built into civil securities fraud cases as
a . . . factor the plaintiff must prove in order to show liability." 25 Neither of
these characteristics hold true for criminal cases. Yet, courts adopted the civil
remedy approach when first confronted with damages in criminal cases26 after
the Guidelines endorsed victim loss as well. 27
C. Calculation Method
With market loss established as the benchmark for damages, civil courts
were tasked with creating a method for calculating the loss in Rule lOb-5
cases. Many possible methods for calculating market loss exist, the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of which are beyond the scope of this Article.28
In early securities cases, courts could not reach consensus on the calculation
20. Id. at 1156 & n.70 (citing Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 825 (E.D.
Wis. 1962)).
21. See id. at 1150 ("When a bank robber steals $1000, there is little question in
anyone's mind of the loss sustained by the robber's victims. Not surprisingly, the loss
would be exactly equal to the actual gain of the robber: $1000.").
22. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 291 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002)
(describing how the district court had calculated plaintiff loss and defendant gain to
be $34.4 million and between $200,000 and $350,000 respectively).
23. McCormick, supra note 6, at 1156.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1156-57.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 536 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing
the district court for defining loss as the "amount fraudulently obtained [i.e. defendant
gain], regardless of intended or actual loss"); United States v. Brach, 942 F.2d 141,
143 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding loss "is not restricted to the harm that a defendant intend-
ed to inflict [i.e. gain] but instead may consist of the 'probable' loss resulting from the
fraud"); United States v. Hughes, 775 F. Supp. 348, 352 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (finding the
law did not allow "courts to use a defendant's gross receipts generally in increasing
the offense level" because "'[g]ross receipts' are not the same thing as 'loss"').
27. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt.3(B) (2010) ("The
court shall use the gain that resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of loss
only if there is a loss but it reasonably cannot be determined.").
28. See McCormick, supra note 6, at 1163-72 (describing each of the major
market loss theories at work in securities fraud cases); see also Philip J. Leas, Note,
The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities,
26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 371-85 (1974).
2011] 1117
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method,29 but courts began to gravitate toward the "out-of-pocket" calculation
method 30 because of its simplicity and its consistency with the common law
understanding of damages.3 1 Ultimately, Congress enacted the 1995 Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),32 mandating that courts use the
rescissory method, which attempts to make the "victim whole by restoring
that person to the position he was in before the fraudulent transaction oc-
curred,"33 in private 1 Ob-5 civil actions. 34 By that point, courts were applying
multiple competing theories of civil damage calculations, and because the
PSLRA does not concern loss calculations at sentencing, 35 any of these theo-
ries - or even other new ones - could be available in the criminal context.
D. Causation
Once courts had settled on market loss and had created suitable calcula-
tive theories, the crucial issue of causation remained. In a private securities
fraud action under Rule lOb-5, any stock purchaser or seller is a potential
victim of the defendant's fraud when the defendant's actions have illegally
manipulated the security's price during a period of time including the vic-
tim's transaction.36 For a widely-held security, this activity can result in
countless victims, and each victim is a potential plaintiff.37 As a result, courts
needed a way to differentiate instances where the defendant's fraud caused
the plaintiffs loss from instances where opportunistic holders of the security
were trying to profit through litigation arising from the disclosed fraud.
Early on, courts looked to the common law of torts for an answer,38 cre-
ating a definition of causation similar to the common law principle of proxi-
29. Leas, supra note 28, at 385.
30. Id. at 383-84 ("If anything is currently the rule of damages under 1Ob-5, it is
the out-of-pocket award.").
31. The theory defines damages as "the difference between the contract price, or
the price paid, and the real or actual value at the date of the sale, together with such
outlays as are attributable to the defendant's conduct." Id. at 383 (quoting Estate
Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527,
533 (10th Cir. 1962)).
32. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
33. McCormick, supra note 6, at 1164.
34. See United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866, 874 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
35. Id.
36. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
37. This fact follows directly from the text of Rule 10b-5: a scheme to defraud or
material misstatement "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" com-
prises a violation, so any purchase or sale tainted by that fraud will constitute a dis-
tinct cause of action. Id.
38. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc. 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1965)
(citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 546 & 538(2)(a) (1938) for definitions of
reliance and materiality in adopting the common law rule of affirmative misrepresen-
Il18 [Vol. 76
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mate cause. 39 The Restatement of Torts defines proximate cause in situations
involving securities as follows:
[O]ne who misrepresents the financial condition of a corporation in
order to sell its stock will become liable to a purchaser who relies
upon the misinformation for the loss that he sustains when the facts
as to the finances of the corporation become generally known and
as a result the value of the shares is depreciated on the market, be-
cause that is the obviously foreseeable result of the facts misrepre-
sented. On the other hand, there is no liability when the value of
the stock goes down after the sale, not in any way because of the
misrepresented financial condition, but as a result of some subse-
quent event that has no connection with or relation to its financial
condition. There is, for example, no liability when the shares go
down because of the sudden death of the corporation's leading of-
ficers. Although the misrepresentation has in fact caused the loss,
since it has induced the purchase without which the loss would
have occurred, it is not a legal cause of the loss for which the mak-
er is responsible.
Courts identified two distinct types of causation at work in securities fraud
41 42
cases: transaction causation - otherwise known as reliance - and loss cau-
sation, which requires a showing "that the untruth was in some reasonably
direct, or proximate, way responsible" for the plaintiffs loss. 43 In other
words, a plaintiff proves transaction causation by showing that the defend-
ant's fraud caused the plaintiff to engage in the transaction in the first place.
Once a plaintiff establishes transaction causation, that plaintiff proves loss
tation for loss causation); see also Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-
the-Market Actions, 31 J. CORP. L. 829, 834-35 (2006).
39. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1495 (2d Cir. 1992)
(generally using the term "proximate cause" as opposed to loss causation); see also
Lawrence J. Zweifach et al., Loss Causation and the Criminal Prosecution of Securi-
ties Law Violations, in SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2005, at
333 (PLI Corp. L. and Prac. Course, Handbook Series No. 6746, 2005).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A (1977).
41. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974);
Fox, supra note 38, at 836; Zweifach, supra note 39, at 332.
42. Schlick, 507 F.2d at 380 ("to show transaction causation a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he relied on the misrepresentations in question when he entered into
the transaction which caused him harm"); Fox, supra note 38, at 840 ("Transaction
causation, as we have seen, involves a showing that the plaintiff would not have pur-
chased but for the misstatement. Thus, transaction causation is just another name for
traditional reliance.").
43. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
2011]1 1119
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causation by showing that the defendant's fraud caused him or her to incur
actual economic damages.44
1. Transaction Causation
Transaction causation seems impossible to prove in a situation where
purchasers or sellers of the securities might not be aware of the defendant's
fraudulent actions. But, in the 1988 case Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,45 the U.S.
Supreme Court bypassed the reliance requirement with the "fraud-on-the-
market" theory." "This theory substitutes for reliance a rebuttable presump-
tion that the securities markets relied on a material misrepresentation made by
the company in question and that the misled investor relied on the market; in
essence, reliance is reflected in the market price of the securities.""7  The
"fraud-on-the-market" theory presupposes that the price of the security on a
public market reflects the defendant's fraud. 48 Thus, absent a defendant in-
troducing evidence to rebut the presumption, plaintiffs need not show that the
fraud caused their transaction.
2. Loss Causation
Despite Basic's guidance on transaction causation, courts continue to
struggle with the loss causation doctrine, even after the PSLRA codified it in
statute.49 Loss causation is linked to the security price, and hence, the theory
of damage calculation, because loss causation involves "a showing by the
plaintiff that the purchased security declined in value from what was paid or
was sold at a loss and that the decline or loss is in some way reasonably relat-
44. See Schlick, 507 F.2d at 380; Zweifach, supra note 39, at 332-33.
45. 485 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1988) ("The modem securities markets, literally in-
volving millions of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-face transac-
tions contemplated by early fraud cases, and our understanding of Rule 1Ob-5's reli-
ance requirement must encompass these differences.").
46. Fox, supra note 38, at 840 ("If courts were seriously to impose a transaction
causation requirement in fraud-on-the-market cases, they would be acting in direct
contradiction to Basic. The whole purpose of Basic was to provide the purchaser in
the secondary trading markets, for whom demonstrating traditional reliance would be
an unrealistic evidentiary burden, an alternative way to demonstrate the causal con-
nection between a defendant's misrepresentation and her injury.").
47. Feinstein, supra note 15, at 862.
48. Id. at 862-63.
49. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, §
21D(b)(4), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)
(2006)) ("In any private action arising under this title, the plaintiff shall have the
burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this title
caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.").
1120 [Vol. 76
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ed to" the defendant's fraud.50 Determining how much the defendant's fraud
or other factors caused the alteration in price is complex. Though the differ-
ing calculative theories attempt to provide some guidance,5 1 the question re-
mains difficult.
In the 2005 case Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that, in interpreting the PSLRA,52 "an inflated purchase
price will not itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant economic
loss." 53 The Court astutely noted that
Given the tangle of factors affecting price, the most logic alone
permits us to say is that the higher purchase price will sometimes
play a role in bringing about a future loss. It may prove to be a
necessary condition of any such loss, and in that sense one might
say that the inflated purchase price suggests that the misrepresenta-
tion (using language the Ninth Circuit used) "touches upon" a later
economic loss. But, even if that is so, it is insufficient. To "touch
upon" a loss is not to cause a loss, and it is the latter that the law
requires.54
Although Dura is an important step toward delineating loss causation, it is a
narrow holding and leaves many questions unanswered, 5 questions that fu-
ture courts likely will address in private plaintiff lOb-5 cases. Part IV dis-
cusses criminal courts' responses to Dura, but first, we must examine how
market loss made the jump from private plaintiff 1 Ob-5 actions to sentencing
criminal defendants.
E. Pre-Guidelines Market Loss in Sentencing
Because of the Guidelines, reduction in securities price plays a central
role in determining the defendant's accountability for loss, as Part III discuss-
es, but as Rule lOb-5 criminal prosecutions of securities fraud ramped up in
the early 1980s, 56 courts had to consider factors like victim loss at sentencing.
Pre-Guidelines sentencing was indeterminate,57 and thus judges rarely noted
their reasoning through written opinions.
50. Fox, supra note 38, at 842.
51. See McCormick, supra note 6, at 1163-64.
52. 544 U.S. 336, 345-46 (2005).
53. Id. at 342.
54. Id. at 343 (emphasis removed) (citations omitted).
55. See Fox, supra note 38, at 846-47.
56. See McCormick, supra note 6, at 1158.
57. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were enacted in part to end this indeter-
minacy. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 40 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3223 ("The sentencing provisions of current law were originally based on a rehabilita-
tion model in which the sentencing judge was expected to sentence a defendant to a
2011] 1121
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Michael Milken was the most famous criminal from the savings-and-
loan frauds of the 1980s.5 While the Guidelines had been implemented prior
to Milken's sentencing, Milken's conduct had occurred before their imple-
mentation, and thus he received "the last of the great pre-guidelines sentenc-
es."59 Consequently, his sentence provides insight into the use of market loss
before the Guidelines. 6 0
61Judge Kimba Wood sentenced Milken to ten years in prison, which
was more than the Guidelines would have provided and was unprecedented in
severity for a white-collar crime.62 In doing so, Judge Wood relied on Milk-
en's role in obliterating substantial capital in the securities markets. Judge
Wood ordered Milken to pay $600 million in restitution and fines.6 Yet,
Judge Wood did not reference a calculation that led to that number.6 Only
the newly-implemented Federal Sentencing Guidelines would require such
calculations.
III. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND
EVOLUTION IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. The Guidelines
The Guidelines require courts to calculate loss, including market loss,
leading to the indispensable role of market loss at sentencing. Congress cre-
ated the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 1984 in response to perceived in-
equities in sentencing, particularly in major white-collar crime. Congress
fairly long term of imprisonment. The defendant was eligible for release on parole
after serving one-third of his term. The parole commission was charged with setting
his release date if it concluded that he was sufficiently rehabilitated. At present, the
concepts of indeterminate sentencing and parole release depend for their justification
exclusively upon this model of 'coercive' rehabilitation - the theory of correction that
ties prison release dates to the successful completion of certain vocational, education-
al, and counseling programs within the prisons. Recent studies suggest that this ap-
proach has failed. . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
58. See Stanton Wheeler, Adversarial Biography: Reflections on the Sentencing
of Michael Milken, 3 FED. SENT'G REP. 167, 167, 169 (1990); see also Esterhay, su-
pra note 1, at 140.
59. Wheeler, supra note 58, at 167-68.
60. Id.
61. United States v. Milken, 3 FED. SENT'G REP. 158, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
62. See Wheeler, supra note 58, at 170.
63. Milken, 3 FED. SENT'G REP. at 161.
64. See id.
65. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 217(a), 98 Stat.
1937, 2017 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006)).
66. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 77 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3260 ("[S]ome major offenders, particularly white collar offenders ... frequently do
1122 [Vol. 76
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67tasked the Commission with drafting a set of Guidelines, which Congress
adopted three years later. In their original form, the Guidelines were man-
datory, requiring federal district court judges to sentence defendants accord-
ing to specified parameters with little variation. As is often the case with
significant Congressional action, a national disaster provided the catalyst for
major legislative intervention. The ongoing savings-and-loan crisis of the
1980s generated much of the impetus for increased white-collar criminal pen-
alties.70
In addition to expanding potential sentences for white-collar crime be-
yond pre-Guideline levels,7 1 the Sentencing Commission identified economic
"loss" as the most significant factor in pre-Guideline sentences for fraud72
and created a "Loss Table" providing for escalating punishment alongside
increasing levels of loss.73 Like quantity of drugs in narcotics cases, 74 loss is
the dominant factor in white-collar sentencing under the Guidelines. 75 While
not receive sentences that reflect the seriousness of their offenses."); Stephen Breyer,
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1988).
67. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2017-34 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2006)); Breyer, supra note 66, at 6.
68. Breyer, supra note 66, at 1.
69. This aspect of the Guidelines was recently found unconstitutional by the U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), causing the
Guidelines to become merely advisory in judges' sentencing decisions.
70. See Esterhay, supra note 1, at 139-40.
71. Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History
and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
373, 385 (2004).
72. In its original commentary to the fraud Guidelines, the Sentencing Commis-
sion stated
Empirical analyses of pre-guidelines practice showed that the most im-
portant factors that determined sentence length were the amount of loss
and whether the offense was an isolated crime of opportunity or was so-
phisticated or repeated. Accordingly, although they are imperfect, these
are the primary factors upon which the guideline has been based.
See United States v. Alpert, 28 F.3d 1104, 1109 (1lth Cir. 1994) (quoting U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Fl, cmt. background (2000)). The Commis-
sion determined past practices based on a statistical analysis of about 10,000 actual
cases. Breyer, supra note 66, at 7.
73. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2010) (current
Guideline loss table).
74. Compare id § 2DI.1(c) (providing a base offense level anywhere from 6 to
38 based on drug quantity), with id. § 2Bl.1(b)(1) (providing an enhancement to of-
fense level anywhere from 0 to 30 based on dollar loss amount).
75. To demonstrate, a recommendation for a first-time offender, even when con-
sidering only base offense level and loss amount under the fraud Guideline, can range
from total offense level 6 to 37, id. § 2B1.1, which yields a guideline-range minimum
2011] 1123
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creating a navigable loss table may be easy, defining and determining eco-
nomic loss in a meaningful way for large-scale fraud has proven difficult.
76Until the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Commission issued amendments
clarifying this term almost annually in an attempt to provide direction to dis-
trict courts applying the Guidelines.77 To illustrate, older Guidelines pro-
nounced that
[T]he loss need not be determined with precision. The court need
only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available in-
formation. This estimate, for example, may be based upon the ap-
proximate number of victims and the average loss to each victim,
or on more general factors such as the scope and duration of the of-
78fense.
Meanwhile, the 2009 Guidelines contain the following statements toward the
same end:
Estimation of Loss. - The court need only make a reasonable esti-
mate of the loss. The sentencing judge is in a unique position to as-
sess the evidence and estimate the loss based upon that evidence.
For this reason, the court's loss determination is entitled to appro-
priate deference. See 18 U.S.C. § 37421 and (f).
The estimate of the loss shall be based on available information,
taking into account, as appropriate and practicable under the cir-
cumstances, factors such as the following:
(i)The fair market value of the property unlawfully taken, copied,
or destroyed; or, if the fair market value is impracticable to deter-
mine or inadequately measures the harm, the cost to the victim of
replacing that property.
(ii) In the case of proprietary information (e.g., trade secrets), the
cost of developing that information or the reduction in the value of
that information that resulted from the offense.
(iii) The cost of repairs to damaged property.
sentence of anywhere from no prison time to nearly 22 years. Id. § 5A. See also
Bowman, supra note 71, at 386.
76. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).
77. See Bowman, supra note 71, at 387.
78. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. 3 (1994).
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(iv) The approximate number of victims multiplied by the average
loss to each victim.
(v) The reduction that resulted from the offense in the value
of equity securities or other corporate assets.
(vi) More general factors, such as the scope and duration of the of-
fense and revenues generated by similar operations.79
As new situations emerged with each prosecution, the Commission struggled
to keep the definition of loss appropriate for every case.
B. Federal Courts' Calculations ofLoss
Of course, individual federal court decisions regarding loss definition
are where the Guidelines are applied to individual defendants, and much of
the evolution in this area of the Guidelines was in response to key rulings on
calculating economic loss. As noted in Part II.E, some courts probably used
reduction in stock price to aid in pre-Guidelines sentence determination, but
this exercise became crucial only when the Guidelines identified "loss" as the
appropriate factor to drive ever-increasing terms of imprisonment. After the
inception of the Guidelines, courts needed to have specific, defensible, and
precise calculations of loss for purposes of the loss table. The use of reduc-
tion in stock price was, therefore, transformed from a factor that received
general consideration to a carefully-constructed calculation in any case where
issues of reduction in stock price were present. The Guideline comment
highlighted above that codified the usage of reduction in stock price for loss
determination was added in 2003 following the passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley,m but by then courts had been applying similar reasoning in prior cases
to the point where such calculations had become routine.
Even so, courts differed in how rigorously they defined market loss for
sentencing purposes. Early in the Guidelines' history, not all courts found
reduction in the price of securities to be an appropriate measure of loss under
the fraud Guideline. In United States v. Bertoli, a 1994 ruling, the District of
New Jersey declined to calculate this loss in applying the Guidelines follow-
ing a prosecution and trial on RICO charges82 that included fraud in the form
79. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.1 cmt. 3(C) (2009) (emphasis
added).
80. See id. cmt. 3(C)(v).
81. See Esterhay, supra note 1, at 146-47, 149 (citing White-Collar Crime Penal-
ty Enhancement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. IX, § 905, 116 Stat. 804, 805-
06; Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,960, 26,964
(May 16, 2003)).
82. 854 F. Supp. 975, 1147 (D.N.J. 1994), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 40 F.3d
1384 (3d. Cir. 1994).
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of stock sold through manipulative techniques to increase artificially the price
on the market leading to an eventual crash and significant loss to investors.
The court decided that because "the victims of the Stock Manipulation
Schemes were the investors who purchased the stock on the public market, as
well as the entire marketplace ... it would be impossible to precisely quantify
the total loss to the investing public." 84 Instead, the court relied on defend-
ant's gains from the scheme, as courts typically do when victim loss is truly
85impossible to calculate.
However, courts abandoned such cursory conclusions as the evolution of
loss under the fraud Guidelines continued, because in situations involving
market loss resulting from reduction in stock price, the courts can estimate
the impact on the victims. For instance, in Bertoli, the government identified
forty brokers and investors who suffered loss from the scheme, but the court
86dismissed the value of such an exercise. Nevertheless, as identified above,
the Guidelines assert that a reasonable estimate will suffice, and courts caught
on, often looking toward developments in civil damages calculations for an-
STS87swers. 8
Courts follow civil damage calculation theory where the criminal prose-
cution arises from security fraud violations of Rule 1Ob-5 since a direct civil
analog for damages calculation from market loss exists.88 In fact, in lOb-5
cases with corresponding civil suits, the court can refer to loss analysis con-
ducted in the civil proceeding. This tactic can be useful because of the com-
plexity of loss calculations and "the greater precision required in civil loss
causation."89 In United States v. Moskowitz, the Second Circuit affirmed a
securities price-reduction loss calculation from the Southern District of New
York because "[t]he district court also had an analysis from the class action
83. Id
84. Id. at 1147-48.
85. Id. (citing United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 937 (3d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692, 702 (7th Cir. 1991)) (both cases involving bank
executives whose fraud only harmed their banks, and by extension, their banks' inves-
tors)).
86. Id. at 1148.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Useful
guidance appears in the applicable principles for recovery of civil damages for securi-
ties fraud."); see also McCormick, supra note 6, at 1158.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866, 874 (N.D. Cal.
2002) ("Since Congress believes the rescissory method is the best means of achieving
uniformity and certainty in securities fraud civil cases, it follows that it is at least an
appropriate method for criminal cases, where certainty and consistency are particular-
ly important."); see also McCormick, supra note 6, at 1163-72 (discussing theories of
market loss deriving from civil cases).
89. Olis, 429 F.3d at 547.
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plaintiffs' expert determining loss to the plaintiffs to be [higher than what the
district court eventually found.]" 90
The district court, however, performs its own market loss calculation,
although usually based on evidence and loss theories that are similar to evi-
dence and loss theories utilized in Rule 10b-5 civil cases.91 In some cases,
the sentencing court is able to rely on the presentence investigation report
when the calculation is not in dispute.92 Because several market loss theories
carry over from civil securities fraud actions, 93 the district court must decide
which theory it will use. Congress passed the PSLRA in 1995, requiring
courts to use the recissory method for civil securities fraud damage calcula-
tions, but Congress did not provide a corresponding requirement for loss cal-
culation at sentencing. 94 Nevertheless, some courts have found the PSLRA
persuasive in criminal settings. For instance, in the 2002 case United States
v. Grabske, the Northern District of California found that the PSLRA sug-
gested courts use the recissory method in lob-5 criminal prosecutions. 95
Even courts that refrain from relying on the PSLRA have been moving
toward the recissory calculations. In United States v. Bakhit, the Central Dis-
trict of California used a modified recissory method incorporating the differ-
ence between the average selling price of stock during the fraud and the aver-
age selling price after the fraud.96 This method was viable in Bakhit because
all outstanding stock was "purchased during the life of the fraud."97 Mean-
while, in United States v. Olis,98 the Fifth Circuit rejected the "oversimpli-
fied" non-recissory model the Southern District of Texas used at sentencing 99
and remanded for resentencing identifying with approval the "more nuanced
90. 215 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
91. The government always introduces its own expert in the criminal proceeding,
even if there was a parallel civil case, because relying on the plaintiff expert would
seem to run counter to the prosecutorial mandate to "do justice" and not simply cause
pecuniary harm. See, e.g., United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866, 873 (N.D.
Cal. 2002). Nevertheless, nothing prevents the defendant from using the same expert
as the plaintiff, and they often do so.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Hedges, 175 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999)
(affirming the district court's market loss calculation where the court adopted the
PSI's loss amount of $92 million and "[t]he only 'evidence' the district court relied on
to support its finding that [the defendant] was responsible for the entire loss was the
PSI's conclusory statements that described his role in the conspiracy").
93. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
95. See Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 874.
96. 218 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1241-42 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also Grabske, 260 F.
Supp. 2d at 872 (discussing Bakhit's calculation as "a form of the recissory method").
97. Id. at 1242.
98. 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005).
99. Id. at 547-49.
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approach modeled upon loss causation principles," the Grabske and Bakhit
courts used. 00
While market loss theories originated in civil securities fraud lawsuits,
prosecutions need not arise from Rule 1 Ob-5 or any type of securities fraud to
incorporate the same reasoning at sentencing. The fraud Guideline also co-
vers larceny, embezzlement, property damage, forgery, and general theft,'0'
providing sentencing levels for almost 100 criminal statutes.102 Any criminal
violation that causes harm to a corporation with outstanding stock can involve
securities price reduction as a factor at sentencing if the harm were substantial
enough to cause such a reduction. The Eleventh Circuit dealt with such a
case in United States v. Snyder,10 3 where the defendants falsified data from
clinical drug studies, causing the stock price to be inflated fraudulently due to
a misplaced expectation by investors that the Food and Drug Administration
would approve the product.'0 In Snyder, the Northern District of Alabama
found that calculating victim loss was not feasible due to the nature of the
loss, despite the fact that the government's expert testified that the defendant
destroyed approximately $34.4 million in stock value.105 Instead, the court
sentenced the defendant based on intended gain, which it found to be between
$200,000 and $350,000. 106 After the government appealed, the Eleventh
Circuit rejected the district court's approach, remanding for calculation of
market loss.107 Like the Fifth Circuit in Ohs,o however, the appeals court
was careful to emphasize that the calculation method should be sophisticated
enough to incorporate principles of loss causation; namely, not all sharehold-
ers suffer a loss when the stock has value after the fraud.109
Interestingly, in Olis, the Fifth Circuit relied on Snyder in its rejection of
the district court's original calculation," 0 but on remand, the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas went through an exhaustive analysis of market loss calculation
theories'1" and decided that "it [was] not possible to estimate with any degree
of reasonable certainty the actual loss to shareholders attributable" to the de-
100. Id. at 547.
101. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 211.1 (2010).
102. Id. cmt. Statutory Provisions.
103. 291 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2002).
104. Id. at 1293.
105. Id. at 1295.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1296.
108. United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 547 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[B]ecause a com-
pany's stock price is affected before and after the fraud, by numerous extrinsic market
influences as well as the soundness of other business decisions by the company, the
calculation of loss attributable to securities fraud requires careful analysis.").
109. Snyder, 291 F.3d at 1296.
110. Olis, 429 F.3d at 547.
111. United States v. Olis, Criminal No. H-03-217-01, 2006 WL 2716048, at *4-9
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006).
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fendant.l12 Two characteristics, however, distinguish the Otis resentencing
from the Snyder sentencing. First, the Olis court conducted a thorough in-
quiry into market loss factors rather than giving up at the outset; and se-
cond, the court found the defendant responsible for $79 million in intended
losses to the U.S. Treasury through fraudulent accounting for tax purposes,
which was close to the lower end of the original $161 million calculation. 114
Despite these differences, both Olis and Snyder demonstrate the difficulties
extant at the district and appellate level in market loss sentencing calcula-
tions.
Thus, the U.S. Sentencing Commission's 2003 amendment to the fraud
Guideline, section 2B 1.1, endorsing the usage of reduction in value of securi-
ties or other corporate assets,1' was not revolutionary when compared to past
federal court practices. The amendment came after directives in the 2002
Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the Commission to review and update the
Guidelines for major white-collar crimes, 11 although the legislation did not
demand the inclusion of stock value reduction language in the fraud Guide-
line."17 Sarbanes-Oxley was a result of the Enron-WorldCom accounting
scandals of 2001-2002," prompting the Commission to expand the loss defi-
nition. Unfortunately the Commission "publish[es] amendments with little or
no explanation of their rationale or intended effect . .. leaving the community
of guidelines users - lawyers, probation officers, and judges - to speculate
about why the rules ha[ve] changed.""'9 In this instance, the Commission
acknowledged without any further description that the comment "was added
to provide courts additional guidance in determining loss in certain cases,
particularly in complex white collar cases."l20 Given this history, the Com-
mission appears to have been encouraging what most courts were doing al-
ready.
A more dramatic development in federal sentencing was the 2005 case
United States v. Booker, which turned the mandatory sentencing Guideline
112. Id. at *9.
113. Id. ("The court's conclusion that it is not possible to estimate with reasonable
certainty the actual loss to shareholders attributable to corrective disclosures about
Project Alpha is based on the facts of this case; it is not a conclusion that such esti-
mates are never possible.").
114. Id. at *9-10.
115. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2010).
116. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
117. See White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
204, tit. IX, § 905, 116 Stat. 804, 805-06; see also Bowman, supra note 71, at 405-06
(describing the lack of specific guidance given to the U.S. Sentencing Commission by
Sarbanes-Oxley).
118. Esterhay, supra note 1, at 137-38.
119. Bowman, supra note 71, at 390.
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regime into an advisory system.121 Booker turned a loss table that the Guide-
lines required federal district court judges to use in setting white-collar sen-
tences into a loss table that the Guidelines required district court judges to
calculate but not necessarily follow. The freedom of judges to ignore the loss
table has exacerbated problems with using securities price reduction to set
sentences.
IV. CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH SECURITIES PRICE
REDUCTION AS Loss
While the potential for error in market loss calculation is obvious,122 the
most troubling aspect of incorporating securities price into loss-related sen-
tencing is the issue of causation. Why should a corporate executive who ben-
efits tangentially from a perpetrated fraud be responsible for the entire
amount of any eventual loss in the securities market? Can the executive
cause such loss by any reasonable understanding of causation? In United
States v. Snyder, Judge James Hill of the Eleventh Circuit wrote a concurring
opinion which highlights the rationale and the underlying difficulty with us-
ing market loss at sentencing:
121. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). There has been a wealth of scholarship on Book-
er, even as it relates specifically to white-collar sentencing. See generally Stephanos
Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 721 (2005); Hector Gonzalez et al., Is Booker a "Loss" for White-Collar
Defendants?, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 181 (2008); Peter J. Henning, White Collar Crime
Sentences After Booker: Was the Sentencing of Bernie Ebbers Too Harsh?, 37
McGEORGE L. REV. 757 (2006); Daniel A. Chatham, Note, Playing with Post-Booker
Fire: The Dangers ofIncreased Judicial Discretion in Federal White Collar Sentenc-
ing, 32 J. CORP. L. 619 (2007); Isaac M. Gradman, Note, Hot Under the White Collar:
What the Rollercoaster in Sentencing Law from Blakely to Booker Will Mean to Cor-
porate Offenders, I N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 731 (2005); Casey C. Kannenberg, Note,
From Booker to Gall: The Evolution of the Reasonableness Doctrine as Applied to
White-Collar Criminals and Sentencing Variances, 34 J. CORP. L. 349 (2008).
In addition, a subsequent line of cases have clarified U.S. Supreme Court
opinions on sentencing. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (holding
appellate courts may not presume a non-Guideline sentence is unreasonable); Kim-
brough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 89, 111 (2007) (holding district courts may
impose non-Guideline sentences, even if their reasoning for doing so is based on
substantive policy disagreements with the Guidelines, and not specific defendant
characteristics); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (holding appellate
courts may presume within-Guideline sentences are reasonable). Thus this Article
will not cover issues with appellate review of sentence reasonableness in any detail.
122. One other article has been written on the usage of market loss in sentencing
for corporate fraud, see McCormick, supra note 6, and it focuses primarily on practi-
cal concerns like calculation complexity and effect on the markets. See id at 1173-
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The type of crime committed here tends to provide a relatively
small and certain amount of expected gain to defendants and a far
larger and less certain loss to innocent investors throughout the
market. Here the perpetrators seek something of value for them-
selves with reckless disregard for their faceless victims. The extent
of their wrongdoing will usually greatly exceed what they hoped to
derive from their nefarious conduct.
The district court, looking at the defendants' expected gain, con-
cluded that for sentencing purposes, the amount of loss attributable
to the defendants was between $200,000 and $350,000. The gov-
ernment's expert concludes that the loss impact upon investors was
$34.4 million! The great difference in the two figures describes
and defines the callousness of defendants who, in order to obtain
relatively little, acted in utter disregard of the vast financial loss
consequence they inflicted on so many. It is not appropriate there-
fore to limit sentencing consequences to defendants' gain, thereby
ignoring victims' loss.
Of course, the estimated loss must not be based upon pure
guesswork or speculation. If however, there is a good basis for a
reasonable estimate, the sentencing court should tend to overlook
fine-tuned objections demanding precise dollar and cent calcula-
tions of loss.123
Judge Hill is correct on both accounts. In market loss cases, sentencing de-
fendants solely based on their limited gains is inappropriate, but sentencing
defendants for loss they are not responsible for also is inappropriate. When
dealing with astronomical numbers, it can be difficult to identify loss beyond
"pure guesswork or speculation." 24
In sentencing Ronald Ferguson to two years in prison despite his life-
time Guidelines for conduct resulting in a $600 million market loss,125 Judge
Christopher Droney of the District of Connecticut went one step further, em-
phasizing the absence of a link between gain to the defendant and loss to the
victims:
Another factor here that is different from so many other corporate
fraud prosecutions is that Mr. Ferguson did not personally gain in a
direct way from his criminal conduct, and his motivation was not
one of obtaining direct personal gain. That certainly does not ex-
cuse his conduct and perhaps does not warrant a departure from the
123. United States. v. Snyder, 291 F.3d 1291, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2002) (Hill, J.,
concurring) (internal citation omitted).
124. Id. at 1297.
125. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. But, surely, it is rel-
evant under the federal sentencing statute. Unlike so many other
recent stock market fraud cases, there was no motivation of direct
personal profit. There was substantial loss caused to AIG stock-
holders here, over 500 million dollars, and Mr. Ferguson surely
was aware of how harmful his conduct could be to the integrity of
the market, but his intent was different from the usual fraud de-
fendant, which is to make money personally and directly from the
illegal conduct. 126
Judge Droney's concern in imputing so much financial loss to the defendant
is well-founded, but his conclusion that Ferguson's case is "different from so
many other corporate fraud prosecutions" 27 is unwarranted. Ferguson is
identical to the other cases discussed, but few judges have focused on the
dilemma inherent in these cases. Judge Droney misses the mark when he
says that "Ferguson did not personally gain in a direct way from his criminal
conduct, and his motivation was not one of obtaining direct personal gain."l28
Ferguson benefited in some way, likely through executive compensation tied
to performance of the company, or through additional business opportunities
for himself.129 However, this case and other cases like it present an issue that
few judges other than Judges Hill and Droney have addressed head-on.
Loss is defined in the commentary as "the greater of actual loss or in-
tended loss."' 30 'Actual loss' means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary
harm that resulted from the offense" 3 1 while "'[i]ntended loss' [] means the
pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense." 32 Intended
loss is irrelevant in these cases because market loss is calculating real "reduc-
tion that resulted from the offense in the value of equity securities or other
126. Transcript of Sentencing at 102-03, United States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp.
2d 447 (D. Conn. 2008) (No. 06-137).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Government's Response to Defendant Ronald E. Ferguson's Sentencing
Memorandum at 25, United States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d. 447 (D. Conn. 2008)
(No. 06-137), 2008 WL 4360457 ("Moreover, Ferguson's motivations here were not
altruistic. As set forth above, he was able to pull in $5 million for Gen Re and was
able to ingratiate himself with his largest client and its CEO, something extremely
important for Ferguson and Gen Re.") (citations omitted).
130. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 211.1 cmt. 3(A) (2010). Loss is,
curiously, neither reviewed by Congress nor given the same precedential weight as
the text of the Guidelines. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 37-40 (1993)
(holding that the commentary to the Guidelines is authoritative unless it violates the
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading
of, that Guideline).
131. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES Manual § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(A)(i).
132. Id. cmt. 3(A)(ii).
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corporate assets."' 3 3 So, the pertinent definition of loss is the reasonably
foreseeable harm that resulted from the offense. This definition raises more
questions than answers, though. First, what does it mean that the loss resulted
from the offense? Is this requirement the same as civil loss causation? Se-
cond, is any market reaction to fraud ever reasonably foreseeable? The fol-
lowing sections address these two questions.
A. Civil Causation Should Be the Bare Minimum
for Criminal Sentencing
The previous two Parts explained that the methodology for using reduc-
tion in securities pricing as a loss factor at sentencing has its origins in private
lOb-5 securities fraud actions and takes important cues from the civil fraud
landscape. But judges in criminal proceedings, while acknowledging their
use of civil fraud concepts, rarely opine on the appropriateness of applying
such concepts to criminal sentencing. Due process is a sacred value in Amer-
ican criminal proceedings,' 34 and consequently loss causation should have a
more limited definition when judges apply it at sentencing.
As a threshold matter, the government needs to prove the facts at sen-
tencing only by a "preponderance of the evidence,"' 35 the same standard of
proof used in civil proceedings. Judges can rely on conduct for which the
defendant was acquitted at trial under the standard of "beyond a reasonable
doubt," due to the different evidentiary burden. Use of the same standard
of proof may seem to imply that courts should use the same theories of causa-
tion. However, this conclusion ignores the divergent goals of private en-
forcement and criminal prosecution. Private 1Ob-5 securities fraud actions
allocate damages in order to "return . . . the injured party to the position he
occupied before he was induced by wrongful conduct to enter the transac-
tion." 3 7 Meanwhile, calculating market loss in criminal cases satisfies the
statutory considerations for sentencing, including the nature of the offense,138
the need for just punishment,' 39 adequate deterrence, 40 and safety of the pub-
133. Id. cmt. 3(C)(v).
134. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1970) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
135. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 559-60 (2002) (plurality opinion)
(reaffirming that a judge may sentence an individual within the Guidelines range
under a preponderance of the evidence standard).
136. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) (per curiam) (citing
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986)) (discussing the evidentiary
threshold difference between statutory elements of the offense and sentencing fac-
tors).
137. United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866, 872 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006).
139. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
140. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
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lic,141 among other factors.142 Judge Hill was correct to note that loss to vic-
tims is the appropriate quantity for gauging offense seriousness, but in situa-
tions with substantial causal ambiguity like securities fraud, courts should not
necessarily calculate market loss with the exact same methodology as in civil
cases. The criminal courts' reactions to the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions
in Basic and Dura, and Congress's intervention with the PSLRA, provide
examples of how criminal courts incorporate developments in civil market
loss calculation.
1. Basic's Fraud-on-the-Market Should Not
Apply at Criminal Sentencing
Part II.D. I described how the Supreme Court in Basic adopted fraud-on-
the-market to eliminate the requirement of transaction causation. 143 While
144the Court's adoption of a "rebuttable presumption of reliance" makes sense
in a civil case where the goal for plaintiffs is to recoup their losses, in a crim-
inal case the justification is less clear. First, victims are not parties in crimi-
nal prosecutions, so a defendant will have more difficulty attacking individual
plaintiffs' arguments for reliance in order to overcome the presumption. Se-
cond, Basic's reasoning and holding was limited to private lOb-5 securities
fraud actions,145 while courts can employ market loss under the Guidelines
for any crime sentenced under section 21 1.1.146 Finally, based on the distinc-
tions between the purposes of sentencing and civil claims, causation should
be a stricter requirement when calculating loss for the Guidelines. In order to
label the defendant as criminally responsible for conduct, the defendant
should have caused the loss in a more concrete way than what fraud-on-the-
market allows. Abolishing the transaction causation link does not make sense
from a due process standpoint when the defendant's personal freedom is at
stake.
Courts employ a cursory level of analysis at sentencing as indicated by
the fact that only one court has even acknowledged that it adopted Basic's
reasoning, despite the fact that almost all market loss calculations require
it.14 7 In sentencing Bernie Ebbers for the WorldCom accounting fraud,148 the
Second Circuit noted, "[T]he loss is that suffered by those investors who
bought or held WorldCom stock during the fraud period either in express
reliance on the accuracy of the financial statements or in reliance on what
141. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
142. See generally id. § 3553(a).
143. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
144. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988).
145. Id. at 243-44.
146. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
147. See generally United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d I10, 112 (2d Cir. 2006).
148. Id. at 112.
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Basic, Inc. v. Levinson described as the 'integrity' of the existing market
price."149 The court neither expounded on the distinction between proving
these two types of loss nor provided any justification as to why the latter type
should be incorporated.
Of course, from a practicality standpoint, abolishing fraud-on-the-
market at sentencing would require an individual analysis of the history and
motivations of each victim, eliminating market loss from consideration at
sentencing. Perhaps market loss is appropriate to consider in a highly re-
stricted and refined form to ensure that the defendant caused the loss. One
would expect that civil loss causation would provide a baseline from which
additional criminal protections are attached. Ironically, the opposite is true.
2. Civil Doctrine Should Apply to Criminal
Market Loss Calculations
The PSLRA was Congress's attempt to regulate private lob-5 actions,
and it provided some guidance on damage calculation,' 50 while Dura required
plaintiffs in such cases to show more than price inflation in order to establish
loss causation. '5 Section 1.2.D established that loss causation is a tricky con-
cept in securities fraud actions with widely-held stock, and civil courts strug-
gle with identifying the correct balance. Criminal courts have noted these
issues as well, such as the difficulty in assessing what investor conduct would
have been, absent the fraud,152 and the difficulty in establishing the underly-
ing value of a stock. 53
Thus, when Congress or the courts act to limit the definition in civil ac-
tions, "considerations relevant to loss causation in a civil fraud case should . .
. apply, at least as strongly, to a sentencing regime in which the amount of
loss caused by a fraud is a critical determinant of the length of a defendant's
sentence."l 54 Shockingly, however, criminal defendants do not always get
the benefit of developments in civil fraud, as courts' responses to Dura show.
While the Second Circuit'55 and the Fifth Circuit'56 have endorsed Dura in
criminal sentencing, the Ninth Circuit rejected it,157 claiming that:
149. Id. at 126-27 (emphasis added).
150. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
152. Ebbers, 458 F.3d at 127.
153. United States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he court may
not assume that the loss inflicted equals the full pre-disclosure value of the stock;
rather, the court must disentangle the underlying value of the stock, inflation of that
value due to the fraud, and either inflation or deflation of that value due to unrelated
causes.").
154. United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007).
155. Id.
156. United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005).
157. United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2009).
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In criminal sentencing, however, a court gauges the amount of loss
caused, i.e., the harm that society as a whole suffered from the de-
fendant's fraud. Whether and to what extent a particular individual
suffered actual loss is not usually an important consideration in
criminal fraud sentencing. Therefore, where the value of securities
have been inflated by a defendant's fraud, the defendant may have
caused aggregate loss to society in the amount of the fraud-induced
overvaluation, even if various individual victims' respective losses
cannot be precisely determined or linked to the fraud. As a result,
the principle underlying the Dura Pharmaceuticals Court's reluc-
tance to allow mere overvaluation as a basis for establishing loss is
generally not present in the criminal sentencing context, and we are
not persuaded that it would be appropriate to expand the Dura
Pharmaceuticals rule to the criminal sentencing context.'58
On its face, this argument is flawed. One can compare what the result
would be for simpler crimes that use loss as the driving sentencing factor. It
would be similar to tacking on lost wages to the amount stolen in a bank rob-
bery where a teller is afraid to come to work the next day or adding against an
extortionist the cost of the phone call communicating the threat. In any crime
many types of "loss to society" occur, but some losses are too attenuated to
apply to defendants under any reasonable understanding of causation. Civil
securities fraud jurisprudence up to and including Dura has tried to define
this boundary, and justifying why defendants in criminal prosecutions should
receive less protection than defendants in civil cases is difficult.
This phenomenon is indicative of a broader problem, in that courts at
criminal sentencing seem to take the loss calculation less seriously than they
do for civil damages, although the situation seems to be changing for the bet-
ter with more district courts issuing written findings on victim loss in securi-
ties fraud cases.159  Nevertheless, commentators universally perceive that
"greater precision [is] required in civil loss causation,", 6 o because the Guide-
lines require only a "reasonable estimate."' 6 Again, determining why courts
should conduct criminal proceedings exposing defendants to enormous terms
of imprisonment with any less precision than civil proceedings is difficult.
158. Id. at 1044 (citation omitted).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d 447, 452 (D. Conn.
2008); United States v. Olis, Criminal No. H-03-217-01, 2006 WL 2716048, at *34
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006); United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866, 874 (N.D.
Cal. 2002); United States v. Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1232,1240-41 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
160. Olis, 429 F.3d at 547.
161. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(C) (2010).
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B. Market Loss Is Not Reasonably Foreseeable as
Required by the Guidelines
Loss causation touches upon issues extending beyond the scope of the
Guidelines, but within the Guidelines, the requirement that the loss be rea-
sonably foreseeable seems impossible to meet with market loss. The fraud
Guideline, in commentary, states that, "'reasonably foreseeable pecuniary
harm' means pecuniary harm that the defendant knew or, under the circum-
stances, reasonably should have known, was a potential result of the of-
fense."l62 In examining market loss for sentencing, courts occasionally cite
this definition,163 but no court has attempted to explain how eventual fluctua-
tions in securities markets can be reasonably foreseeable at the time the de-
fendant is committing the fraud. The factors that complicate loss causation
such as volatility in the markets, unpredictable investors, and unknowable
underlying stock value contribute to the impossibility of foreseeing market
price response. Thus, reasonable foreseeability is similar to loss causation
but limited in application to sentencing under the Guidelines, further solidify-
ing the notion that civil loss causation should provide only the starting point
for examination at sentencing.
One could argue that the defendant should know that some negative
market response is possible from major fraudulent transactions on the open
market, so courts should hold him responsible even if the exact harm is un-
known. But the paradigmatic defendant for whom market loss is the main
sentencing factor does not perpetrate the fraud with a potential drop in securi-
ties price in mind; like Ferguson, he is trying to benefit his company or its
clients, personally profiting through the rewards of performing his job suc-
cessfully. Such defendants deserve substantial punishment due to the seri-
ousness of their offense, but the claim that market loss was reasonably fore-
seeable is untenable.
Because courts have not extracted reasonable foreseeability from gen-
eral loss causation, no decisions address this topic, and defense attorneys
have not picked up on it as a separate attack on Guidelines loss calcula-
tions.16" Nevertheless, many market loss sentences could be assailable on
these grounds. No matter what, "[g]iven the potentially draconian sentences
that can be meted out in securities fraud prosecutions, it can be expected that
the role of loss causation in criminal sentencing proceedings will continue to
be vigorously contested by the government and the criminal defense bar."' 6 5
162. Id. cmt. 3(A)(iv).
163. See, e.g., Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 450-51; Olis, 2006 WL 2716048, at
*3.
164. None of the defendant briefs or sentencing memos for any of the cases cited
in this Article contain an argument that loss was not reasonably foreseeable.
165. Zweifach, supra note 39, at 341.
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C. United States v. Booker
The transformation of the Guidelines from mandatory to advisory in
United States v. Booker is not by itself a problem for market loss sentencing.
But when combined with the issues this Part discusses, Booker has and will
continue to lead to enormous disparity in major white-collar sentencing where
market loss'is a factor. Major white-collar crimes have downward departure
rates and magnitudes far above major "street" crimes,166 and many white-
collar crimes with the highest Guideline ranges implicate market loss due to
167the loss numbers in the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars.1 Booker
allows judges to depart downward based on whims, and the Government al-
most never appeals such departures.168 Additionally, at least one author pos-
ited that the increased discretion Booker affords might lead to longer sentenc-
es because "calculation of loss is a fairly defendant-unfriendly exercise."l69
When courts do not have to apply rigorously the Guidelines and the various
protections therein, the calculations could become sloppier.17 0
When confronted with a Ferguson-type defendant who gains only indi-
rectly from his fraud through typical job-related perks, many judges will be
tempted to depart downward based on Booker as Judge Droney did,171 rather
than create a more relevant definition of loss. Different judges will find other
loss quantities to substitute, as in the Olis case on remand.172 Still other judg-
es will stick to the stratospheric Guideline range. The result is wide-ranging
disparity without any meaningful evolution in the definition of market loss.173
166. See Esterhay, supra Pote 1, at 152-65.
167. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Bl.1(b)(1). A sentence driv-
en by market loss can easily result in a Guidelines recommendation of life in prison,
because such loss is often well above $400 million, the maximum on the loss table, id.
§ 2Bl.1(b)(1)(P), and price reduction for widely held securities will always have at
least 250 victims, id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C). Adding the base offense level of 7, id. §
2Bl.1(a)(1), the resulting offense level is 43, which is a lifetime Guideline recom-
mendation for even a first-time offender. Id. § 5A.
168. See Mark T. Bailey, Note, Feeney's Folly: Why Appellate Courts Should
Review Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with Deference, 90 IOWA
L. REv. 269, 299-300 (2004) ("[T]he government very rarely appeals downward de-
partures." (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT To CONGRESS: DOWNWARD
DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, at 55-56 (2003))). The
Government filed no appeal in Ferguson, for instance, which was a downward depar-
ture from life in prison to two years. See Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d 447.
169. Gonzalez, supra note 121, at 185.
170. See generally id.
171. See Transcript of Sentencing at 102-03, United States v. Ferguson, 584 F.
Supp. 2d 447 (D. Conn. 2008) (No. 06-137).
172. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Esterhay, supra note 1, at 169-71 (comparing Ferguson, who re-
ceived two years in prison, to a similarly-situated defendant, who received thirty years
in prison).
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As Judge Hill noted in Snyder, victim loss should not be ignored,174 but
Booker allows judges to do so when they view high Guidelines as inappropri-
ate for the defendant.
One could contend that the true culprit is not Booker but the notable ex-
tension of Guideline terms for major white-collar criminals, most recently
with the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.' 7 5 High Guidelines ranges lead to more
disparity between judges who reject the Guidelines and those judges that ac-
cept them. But this argument ignores the Executive and Legislative branches'
stance that the instances of financial disaster in the last decade warrant more
extreme penalties.' The argument also ignores the differences judges might
perceive between a Ferguson-type defendant, who does not benefit directly
from his billion-dollar fraud and a Bernie Madoff-type defendant, who stole
billions of dollars and is more deserving of a long prison term.177 While
some judges might perceive this difference, the Guidelines do not.' 7 8 How-
ever, Congress could modify the Guidelines to account for this recognized
distinction, and the next Part presents one way to do so.
V. A WORKABLE SOLUTION
The solution to the problems discussed supra is to draft a parallel loss
table for market loss that enhances offense level less severely than the current
loss table. As the previous discussion illustrates, loss related to stock price
movement is different from any other type of victim loss, and the Guidelines
should recognize this distinction. The different manner of loss corresponds to
the distinction in culpability between defendants like Ferguson and Madoff.
If loss occurs only through subsequent fluctuations in stock price on the mar-
ket, then the causal link is weaker, and the defendant is less culpable. Be-
cause market losses occur as a result of market transactions, the defendant in
such cases has no direct profit from or connection with the loss amount. Ac-
cordingly, Congress should modify the Guidelines to address this fact.
The high sentence ranges the Guidelines provide are appropriate for
fraud where loss exists beyond the market. In Madoff's case, the multi-
billion dollar loss amount was staggering, but individual victims of Madoffs
scheme suffered this loss.179 Direct investment in Madoff's fraudulent organ-
174. United States v. Snyder, 291 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002) (Hill, J., con-
curring) (citation omitted).
175. See Esterhay, supra note 1, at 139-152.
176. Id.
177. See Derick R. Vollrath, Note, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More
Just Sentencing Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1002-03
(2010).
178. Id.
179. See Government's Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Madoff, Crim-
inal No. 09-213, 2009 WL 1899501 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 26, 2009) (calculating Madoff's
11392011]
27
Esterhay: Esterhay: Apples and Oranges
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
MISSOURI LAWREVIEW
ization was the cause of their financial loss. His sentence of 150 yearsiso is
not problematic because he is the type of defendant that courts should punish
most severely. His offense is similar to simple theft, as he stole the money
included in the loss calculation.
Meanwhile, Ferguson had no direct contact with the approximately $600
million in losses. These losses resulted from third-party transactions over an
efficient securities market after the revelation of the fraud.18' The emphasis
on issues of loss causation throughout this Article shows that causation is
tenuous in such cases, and the defendant's responsibility for the loss is there-
fore more attenuated. The Guidelines should not treat such market loss
equivalently to direct theft. Although the court based Ferguson's lenient sen-
tencing in part on his exemplary character,182 it also identified the defendant's
indirect connection to the loss.183 Such reasoning is warranted when the dis-
tinction between market loss and direct loss is accepted.
The unique character of market loss has been masked by its evolution at
criminal sentencing, but it has roots in civil securities fraud and common tort
law. Market loss should have a place at sentencing because criminal culpa-
bility must be classified based on victim loss, as Judge Hill observed. 184
However, it should not provide the same level of prison term severity as di-
rectly established victim loss.
The most obvious solution is to create a separate corresponding loss ta-
ble with less severe enhancements. The actual numbers should be based on
study and debate at the U.S. Sentencing Commission, but for purposes of
discussion, this Article provides the following as an amended loss table for
the fraud Guideline:
Guideline range based on $13 billion in losses uncovered from the scheme up to that
point).
180. United States v. Madoff, Criminal No. 09-213, 2009 WL 3347945, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2009).
181. See United States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d. 447, 453 (D. Conn. 2008)
("Davis' standard event study of February 14, 2005, March 14, 2005, and March 15,
2005 does result in a reasonable estimate of the loss between $544 million and $597
million. On each of these days, new and significant information related to the LPT
fraud was disclosed, and there was a statistically significant price reaction in AIG's
stock price.").
182. Transcript of Sentencing at 100-02, Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d. 447 (No. 06-
137).
183. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
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§2B13.1
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If the loss exceeded $5,000, apply the greater increase from (A)
and (B) to offense level.
(A) For loss calculated from securities price changes in an exchange
or other efficient securities market, increase the offense level as fol-
lows:
Loss (Apply the Greatest) Increase in Level
(i)$ 1,000,000 or less no increase
(ii) More than $1,000,000 add 2
(iii) More than $5,000,000 add 4
(iv) More than $10,000,000 add 6
(v) More than $50,000,000 add 8
(vi) More than $100,000,000 add 10
(vii) More than $200,000,000 add 12
(viii)More than $400,000,000 add 14
(ix) More than $1,000,000,000 add 16
(x) More than $5,000,000,000 add 18
(xi) More than $10,000,000,000 add 20
(B) For all other calculated loss, increase the offense level as follows:
--Present Loss Table Placed Here--'8 5
The market loss table is designed as an alternate loss table, such that
courts can use the original table for other types of demonstrable loss that pro-
vide a greater enhancement than market loss. Multiple types of loss might
arise from the same case, so these losses must factor into sentencing even if
market loss is at play. This setup allows for situations like the Olis case on
remand, where the district court found that the defendant was responsible for
$79 million in tax losses to the U.S. Treasury, regardless of what the market
loss might have been. 8 6
To demonstrate how this loss table would work, this Article will apply
the proposed rules to the Ferguson sentencing. Ferguson received the maxi-
mum loss enhancement, a victim enhancement,' 8 and an organizer-leader
185. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2010).
186. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
187. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)(P).
188. Id. § 2Bl.1(b)(2)(C).
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enhancement,189 resulting in lifetime Guidelines.190 With the split loss table
and Ferguson's $600 million loss provable only as a market loss, his loss
enhancement would be less than half the original value. The new loss table
yields a Guideline range of 108-135 months for a first time offender, 19 rather
than life. Such a reduced Guideline range corresponds more accurately with
the defendant's culpability in a market loss-only situation; on the other hand,
if the court found that $600 million was direct loss, Ferguson would be rec-
ommended for life. Therefore, the Guideline amendment adequately address-
es the difference in loss type.
VI. CONCLUSION
The unique character of loss on the market should justify a separate
treatment in calculating losses for purposes of criminal sentencing, but while
appropriating the theory from civil securities law, few judges have empha-
sized this distinction. The causal link that civil jurisprudence has established
between the defendant's conduct and the eventual loss on the market is ques-
tionable at best when viewed in terms of the defendant's personal responsibil-
ity. Although perpetrators of major fraud deserve harsh punishment, direct
losses and market losses are different.
While victim loss is and should continue to be the driving factor in fraud
sentence length, this loss must be well-defined, and therefore, market loss
should impact sentencing, but under a less severe loss table than direct loss.
Until the Guidelines account for market loss peculiarities, judges will contin-
ue to view Guideline sentences for all major frauds with skepticism and likely
will refuse to apply the harshest sentences in market loss situations. A sepa-
rate loss table is just one solution to this problem; whatever the ultimate reso-
lution, courts must consider market loss in a new light to ensure fair and rea-
sonable sentencing for major white-collar frauds.
189. Id. § 3B1.1(a).
190. Id. § 5A. See Esterhay, supra note 1, at 170-71 (parsing the Guidelines in
the Ferguson sentencing).
191. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (providing this range for
offense level 31, which is 16 less than the original 47, corresponding to the difference
between the original and new loss enhancements).
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